Stakeholders' Perceptions on Corporate Governance Constitution and Their Implications on Board Performance by Tsafe, Bashir Mande
  
STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CONSTITUTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON BOARD PERFORMANCE 
  
                          
 
 
                                      
                         
 
                              
                                             
 
                          
                               
                                   BASHIR MANDE TSAFE 
 
 
                                  
 













Thesis submitted to the Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business 
Universiti Utara Malaysia, in fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 
                            
                          
                          
                                       
  ii 
                                               Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in fulfillment of the requirement for the award of Doctor of 
Philosophy from Universiti Utara Malaysia, I agree that the Libraries of this University 
may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying 
of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted 
by the supervisors of this thesis or, in their absence, by the Dean of the Othman Yeop 
Abdullah Graduate School of Business. It is understood that any copying or publication 
or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without any 
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to 
the Universiti Utara Malaysia in any scholarly use which may be made of any material 
in my thesis. 
 
Request for permission to copy or make other use of materials in this thesis, in whole or 
in part should be addressed to: 
 
 
                                                           Dean 
                    Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business 
                                         Universiti Utara Malaysia 
                                              06010 UUM Sintok 





                                                             
  iii 
                                                            Abstract     
 
This study takes steps towards developing behavioral principle-based board process as 
success dimension to effective board role performance. In the literature, dominant 
corporate governance research that centered on rule-based board structure has so far 
yielded conflicting and ambiguous results. These could not transform effective corporate 
functioning, thus inconclusive. This study also stimulates debates about the extension of 
corporate governance literature in the stakeholder theoretical perspective, which 
incorporates both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders, as a comprehensible 
preference to the traditionally dominant agency model in an attempt to offer a more 
inclusive approach and strengthen the existing governance structure in Nigeria. This 
suggests having employee representatives and creditor seats on board to participate in 
firm’s top decisions. The study also examines factors responsible for reported weak 
enforcement in relations to board performance, with the broad objective of investigating 
if the combination of these factors constitute effective corporate governance and explain 
board performance. Based on survey perceptions of 154 respondents from the Nigerian 
capital market sampled participants, the study employs confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) in a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. Thus, a model that relates 
board process and three stakeholders constructs to board performance is proposed. 
Building upon board process dimensions such as cognitive conflict, effort norms, use of 
knowledge and skills, and groupthink; this study finds that board process is significantly 
related to board performance. In addition, building upon the three stakeholder 
constructs, this study also finds creditor participation to be significantly related to board 
performance. However, employee participation and regulatory enforcement show 
insignificant relationship with board performance. The study concludes that combination 
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                                                                  Abstrak 
 
    
Kajian ini bertujuan meningkatkan gelagat lembaga pengarah berasaskan prinsip sebagai 
dimensi kejayaan dalam memainkan peranan lembaga pengarah secara efektif. Ini 
memandangkan kebanyakan penyelidikan dalam bidang tadbir urus korporat yang 
bertumpu kepada pemboleh ubah lembaga pengarah berasaskan peraturan bercanggah 
dan  mengelirukan. Keputusan ini juga tidak dapat menghasilkan perubahan fungsi 
korporat secara efektif. Kajian ini juga akan merangsang pembahasan mengenai tadbir 
urus korporat dari perspektif teori pihak berkepentingan, yang menggabungkan kedua 
pemegang saham dan pihak berkepentingan bukan-pemegang saham, sebagai alternatif 
kepada teori agensi yang secara tradisinya dikuasai oleh model Anglo-Saxon. Ini sebagai 
usaha untuk menawarkan pendekatan yang lebih terangkum dan mengukuhkan struktur 
tadbir urus yang sedia ada di Nigeria. Kajian ini mencadangkan lembaga pengarah 
penasihatan perlu dianggotai oleh wakil pekerja dan pemiutang dalam membuat 
keputusan peringkat atasan. Kajian ini juga mengkaji faktor-faktor yang dapat mengatasi 
penguatkuasaan yang lemah berkaitan prestasi lembaga pengarah. Kaji selidik persepsi 
terhadap 154 responden ahli pasaran modal Nigeria ini menggunakan analisis faktor 
pengesahan (CFA) dalam pendekatan Model Struktur  Persamaan  (SEM). Dalam model 
ini, proses lembaga pengarah dan tiga konstruk pihak berkepentingan kepada prestasi 
lembaga adalah dicadangkan. Berdasarkan konstruk proses lembaga pengarah seperti 
konflik kognitif, norma-norma usaha, penggunaan pengetahuan dan kemahiran, dan 
pemikiran berkumpulan, kajian ini mendapati bahawa perkara-perkara yang diukur 
dalam konstruk ini mempunyai hubungan signifikan dengan prestasi lembaga pengarah. 
Di samping itu, berdasarkan tiga kontruk pihak berkepentingan, kajian ini juga 
mendapati penyertaan pemiutang adalah signifikan kepada prestasi lembaga pengarah. 
Walaubagaimanapun, penyertaan pekerja dan penguatkuasaan tidak memberi hubungan 
yang signifikan. Kajian ini menyimpulkan bahawa proses lembaga pengarah dan 
penyertaan pemiutang menyumbang kepada tadbir urus yang efektif dan dapat memberi 




Kata Kunci: tadbir urus korporat, proses lembaga pengarah, prestasi lembaga pengarah, 
pihak berkepentingan kontraktual, penguatkuasaan 
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                                                    Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Research 
 
In the contemporary period, large corporations have emerged because of capital market 
integration that necessitates separating wealth owners from the control of their firms. 
Hence, investors in US can own large stakes in Asian and African corporations and vice 
versa without having to travel to the investing environments and skilled labor can be 
out-sourced across borders, making the entire world a global village. In this regard, vast 
literature on corporate governance have been documented, with focus mainly on outside 
shareholder protection, thus governance rules, which had thrived for centuries, seem to 
continue in the realms of contemporary literature in many different perspectives. 
 
The dominant theory in the shareholder-oriented governance is the principal-agent 
model, which regards the central problem of corporate governance as self-interested 
managerial behavior, when the agent does not share the principal’s objectives (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Gupta, Otley & Young, 2008; and Rashidah & 
Mohammad Rizal, 2010). They affirm that, managers of corporations who influence the 
firm’s decisions may act selfish at the detriment of the outside investors, and it is 
difficult for the principal to verify their agents’ integrity, which results in agency 
problems. In this respect, advocates of the Anglo-American governance arrangement 
identify the need to provide the outside investors with adequate protection. As a result, 
when principals attempt to ensure that agents act in their invested interests, agency cost 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
  334 
REFERENCES 
 
Abor, J. and Adjasi, C. K. D. (2007). Corporate governance and the small and medium 
 enterprises sector: Theory and implications. Corporate Governance, 7(2), 12. 
 
Abubakar, A. (2007). Corporate governance: SEC intensifies motivation for firms to 
 comply. Paper presented at a World Bank Sponsored Conference in Corporate 
 Governance, 26 March, Kano, Nigeria. 
 
Adams, R. and Mehran, H. (2003). Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies? Economic Policy Review 9, 123-142. 
 
Adams, R. and Mehran, H. (2011). Bank board structure and performance: evidence for 
large bank holding companies. Working Paper Series. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945548 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.1945548. 
 
Addison, J. T., Schnabel, C. and Wagner, J. (1999). German Works Councils, Profits, 
and Innovation, In Sadowski, D. Junkes, J. and Lindenthal, S. (2005). The 
German  Model of Corporate and Labor Governance, Company Labor Law 
and Policy  Journal, 22(33).  
 
Addison, J. and Belfield, C. (2001). Updating the determinants of firm performance: 
estimation using the 1998 UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 39(3), 341–66. 
 
Adelegan, O. J. (2004). How efficient is the Nigerian Stock Market? Further Evidence. 
Africa Review of Money, Finance and Banking, (5)3, 145-165. 
 
Agbakoba, O. and Fagbohunlu, T. (2010). Bankruptcy and winding up proceedings: 
potential mechanisms for speedier debt recoveries. Working Paper. 
  335 
Ahmed, M. (2007). Corporate governance: A new fad or an important development 
 prerequisite. Paper presented at a British Council Management Forum, 3-4 April, 
 Abuja. 
 
Al-Faki, M. (2007). Corporate governance and financial reporting. Paper presented at a 
 World Bank Sponsored Conference in Corporate Governance, 26 March, Kano, 
 Nigeria.  
 
Al-Hussaini, A., Al-Shammari, B. and Al-Sultan, W. (2008). Development of 
enforcement mechanisms following adoption of international  accounting 
standards in the gulf co-operation council member states. International Journal 
of Business Strategy, 8(3). 
 
Allen, F. Carletti, E. and Marquez R. (2009). Stakeholder capitalism, corporate 
 governance and firm value. Working Paper, 07-39, Wharton Financial 
 Institutions Centre, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Amao, O. and Amaechi, K. (2007). Galvanising shareholder activism: a prerequisite for 
effective corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. Journal of 
Business Ethics (2008) 82, 119–130. 
 
Anderson, S. (2000). The internationalisation of the firm from an entrepreneurial 
perspective. International Studies of Management and Organization 30 (1), 63-
92. 
 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board Composition: balancing family influence in 
S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 49, 209-237. 
 
Andrews, K. (1980). Directors’ responsibility for corporate strategy. Harvard Business 
Review, 58, 30–42. 
 
  336 
Aoki, M. and Patrick, H. (eds) (1994). The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance 
 for Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
 Press. 
 
Aoki, M. (2005). Whither Japan’s Corporate Governance. In Surasak Chaithanakij 
 (2008). The Dilemma of Japan’s Corporate Governance. Chulalongkorn Journal 
 of Economics, 20(1), 27-52. 
 
Araki T. (2005). A Comparative Analysis: Corporate governance and labour and 
 employment relations in Japan. Company Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22(1).   
 
Arbuckle, J. L. (2005). Amos 7.0 User’s Guide, Chicago, IL: SPSS Inc. 
 
Armstrong, J. S. and Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in surveys. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 14, 396-402. 
 
Attas, D. (2004). A moral stakeholder theory of the firm, cited in Fassin (2009). The 
stakeholder model refined. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 113-135.  
 
Barry N. (2002). The stakeholder concept of corporate control is illogical and 
impractical. The Independent Review, 6(4), 541-554. 
 
Bartlett, J. E., Kotrlik, J. O., and Higgins, C. C. (2001). Organizational research: 
determining appropriate sample size in survey research. Information Technology, 
Learning and Performance Journal, 19(1), 43-50. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., and Hamdani, A. (2009). The elusive quest for global governance 
standards. University of Pennsylvania Law Review,157(5), 1263-1317.  
 
  337 
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A. and Ferrell, A. (2004). What matters in corporate governance. 
 Working Paper No. 491. Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Berglöf, E. and Claessens, S. (2004). Corporate Governance and Enforcement. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3409. 
 
Berle, A. and Means, C. G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Macmillan, New York. 
 
Bhagat, S. and Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and 
 long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231-73. 
 
Bhagat, S. and Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 14, 257-273. 
 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B. and Romano, R. (2008). The promise and peril of corporate 
governance indices. Columbia Law Review, 108(8), 1803-1882. 
 
Black, B. (2001). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. 
Emerging Markets Review 2, 89–108. 
 
Black, B. S. and Kim, W. (2006). The value of board independence in an emerging 
 market: IV, DiD, and time series evidence from Korea. Law and Economics 
 Working Paper. University of Texas School of Law. 
 
Blair, M. (1995). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21
st
 
Century. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
 
Blair, M. and Roe, M. (1999) Employees and Corporate Governance 276. 
 
  338 
Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A (1999). A team production theory of corporate law. 
Virginia Law Review, 85(2), 247-328.   
 
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural Equation Models with Latent Variables, New York: 
Wiley & Sons. 
 
Borio, C. and Drehmann M. (2009). Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises – Revisited. 
BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009. 
 
Bosch, H. (1993). Corporate Practices and Conduct (2
nd
 ed.). Information Australia, 
 Melbourne. 
 
Bosch, H. (1995). The Director at Risk: Accountability in the Boardroom. Pitman 
 Publishing, Melbourne.  
 
Boyd, D. P. (2003). Chicanery in the corporate culture: a worldcom or world con? 
Corporate Governance, 3(1), 83-85. 
 
Brennan, N. M. and Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate governance, accountability and 
 mechanisms of accountability: An overview. Accounting, Auditing and 
 Accountability Journal, 21(7), 885-906. 
 
Brown, D. L. and Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. 
Journal of Accounting & Public policy, 25(4), 409-434. 
 
Brown, P. and Tarca, A. (2005). A commentary on issues relating to the enforcement of 
 international financial reporting standards in the EU. European Accounting 
 Review, 14(1), 181-212.  
 
  339 
Brown, P. and Tarca, A. (2007). Achieving high quality, comparable financial reporting: 
 A comparison of independent enforcement bodies in Australia and the United 
 Kingdom. Abacus Dec2007, 43(4), 438-473. 
 
Byrne, B. M. (2010). Structural equation modeling with AMOS: basic concepts, 
applications, and programming (2nd ed.). New York: Rouledge Taylor & 
Francis Group. 
 
Cadbury, S. A. (1992). Codes of Best Practice, Report of the Committee on Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance. Gee & Co, London. 
 
Cairns, D. (1990). Aid for the Developing World. Accountancy, 105(1159), March 82-
85. 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria (2008). Report of Banking Supervision Department, 2008. 
Abuja 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria (2009). Monthly Bulletin, June, 2009. Abuja. 
 
Chaithanakij, S. (2008) The Dilemma of Japan’s Corporate Governance. Chulalongkorn 
 Journal of Economics, 20(1), 27-52. 
 
Chiejine, F. C. (2010). Corporate governance in the Nigerian banking sector: an ethical 
analysis of the 2009 regulator intervention and operators’ behavior. University of 
Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons. 
 
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W. and Yoo, S. S. (2007). The value of outside directors: evidence 
from corporate governance reform in Korea, Journal of Finance and 
Quantitative  Analysis, 42(4), 941. 
 
  340 
Churchill, G. A. (1979). A paradigm for developing better measures of marketing 
constructs. Journal of Marketing Research, 16, 64-73. 
 
Churchill, G. A. Jr., and Brown, T. J. (2004). Basic marketing research (5
th
 ed.). 
Sydney: South-Western College. 
 
Claessens, S. (2006). Corporate governance and development. World Bank Research 
 Observer, 21(1), 91-122. 
 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Larry, L. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81– 112. 
 
Clifford, P. and Evans, R. (1997). Non-Executive Directors: a question of independence. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5, 224–231.  
 
Coakes, S. J., Steed, L. and Ong, C. (2009). SPSS: analysis without anguish: version 16 
for windows. 
 
Collier, P. (2008). Stakeholder accountability: A field study of the implementation of a 
 governance improvement plan. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
 21(7), 933-954. 
 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990). Statutory framework for companies listed in 
 Nigerian capital market.   
 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) (2003). Standard No.1 on 
 Financial Information: Enforcement of Standards on Financial Information in 
 Europe, CESR/03-073. 
 
  341 
Cooke, W. (1994). Employee participation programmes, group based incentives and 
company performance: a union–non union comparison. Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, 47(4), 594–609. 
 
Corporate Leadership Council (2004). Driving Performance and Retention through 
Employee Engagement – Executive Summary. UK. 
 
Corporate Leadership Council (2008). ‘Improving Employee Performance in the 
Economic Downturn’. UK. 
 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001). Saints and Sinners: Whos got Religion?  
 
Cully, M., Woodland, S., O’Reilly, A. and Dix, G. (1999). Britain at Work. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R. and Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: decades 
of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review 28(3), 371–383. 
 
Dalton, D. R. and Dalton, C. M. (2005). Boards of directors: utilizing empirical evidence 
in developing practical prescriptions. British Journal of Management 16, 91-97. 
 
Davis, G. F. (2005). New directions in corporate governance. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 31, 143-162. 
 
Davies, M. and Schlitzer, B. (2008). The impracticality of an international one size fits  
all corporate governance code of best practice. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
23(6),  532-544. 
 
Deeg, R. (1999) Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and German Political Economy. 
 Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
 
  342 
De Long, J. B. (1991). Did Morgan’s Men add value? An economist’s perspective on 
financial capitalism. University Press, Chicago. 
 
Denis, D. K. (2001). Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research . . . and 
Counting. Review of Financial Economics, 10, 191–212. 
 
Denis, D. and McConnell, J. (2003). International corporate governance. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 1-36. 
 
Dewing, I. P. and Russell, P. O. (2008). The individualization of corporate governance: 
 The approved persons’ regime for UK financial services firms. Accounting, 
 Auditing and Accountability Journal, 21(7), 978-1000. 
 
Diamond, D. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106, 1027-1054. 
 
Doidge, C. G., Karolyi, A. and Stulz, R. (2004). Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. 
 worth more? Journal of Financial Economics, 71, 205-38.  
 
Donaldson, L. (1990). The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management 
 Theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369-81. 
 
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
 concepts, evidence and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20, 65-
 91. 
 
Dore, R. (2000). Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany 
 Versus the Anglo-Saxons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dore, R. (2005). Comment: papers on employees and corporate governance. Company 
Labor Law and Policy Journal (22)159. 
  343 
Drummond, H. (2002). Living in a fool’s paradise: The collapse of Barings’ Bank. 
 Management Decision, 40(3), 232-8. 
 
Easterbrook, F. (1984). Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends. American 
Economic Review 74, 650-659. 
 
Edwards, J. and Fischer, K. (1994). Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany. New 
 York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Evan, W. M., and Freeman, E. R. (1993). A stakeholder theory of the modern 
orporation: A Kantian Analysis. In Ethical Theory and Business, 4th ed., edited 
by Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, 75–84. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Falola, T. and Heaton, M. M. (2008). A History of Nigeria, (Illustrated edition). 
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 052168157X, 9780521681575. 
 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
 Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-26. 
 
Fassin, Y. (2009). The stakeholder model refined. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 113-
 135.  
 
Fearnly, S. and Hines, T. (2003). The regulatory framework for financial reporting and 
 auditing in the UK: The present position and impending changes. The 
 International Journal of Accounting, 38(2), 215-233. 
 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) (2002). Discussion paper on 
 enforcement of IFRS within Europe, April. Available at 
 http://www.fee.be/publications/main.htm  
 
  344 
Fernie, S. and Metcalf, D. (1995). Participation, contingent pay, representation and 
workplace performance: evidence from Great Britain. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 33(3), 379–431. 
 
Finkelstein, S. and Mooney, A. (2003). Not the usual suspects: how to use board process 
to make boards better. Academy of Management Executive 17(2), 101–113. 
 
FitzRoy, F. R and Kraft, K. (1993). Innovation, Rent Sharing and the Organization of 
 Labor. FRG, Small Business Economics, 2, 95. 
 
Forbes, D. and Milliken, F. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: understanding 
 boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Administrative Science 
 quarterly, 29(4), 499-517. 
 
Forsyth, D. R. (1990). Group Dynamics. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing 
Co. 
 
Francis, I. (1997). Future Direction: The Power of the Competitive Board, FT Pitman, 
 Melbourne. 
 
Freedman, C. (2007). Japan. In Chaithanakij, S. (2008) The Dilemma of Japan’s 
 Corporate Governance. Chulalongkorn Journal of Economics, 20(1), 27-52. 
 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Pitman, 
Boston. 
 
Freeman, E. (1999). Divergent stakeholder theory. Academy of Management Review, 24 
(2), 233–6. 
 
Freeman, R. and Rogers, J. (1994). What do Workers Want? Voice, Representation and 
 Power in the American Workplace   
  345 
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C. and Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder theory and the 
corporate objective revisited. Organization Science, 15, 364-369.  
 
Frick, B. and Sadowski, D. (1995). Works councils, unions and firm performance. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2004). Context, behavior, and evolution: challenges in 
research on boards and governance. International Studies of Management and 
Organizations, 34(2), 11–36. 
 
Gallup (2006). Gallup Study: Feeling Good Matters in the Workplace. 
 
Gatenby, M., Rees, C., Soane, E. and Truss, C. (2009). Employee engagement in context. 
London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.  
 
Ghozali, I. and Fuad, M. (2005). Structural Equation Modelling, BP-Undip, Semarang. 
 
Gillan, S. L. (2006). Recent development in corporate governance: an overview. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 12(3),  381-402. 
 
Gilson, S. (1990). Bankruptcy, boards, banks and block holders. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27, 355-387. 
 
Gilson, R. (2006). Controlling shareholders and corporate governance: complicating the 
comparative taxonomy. Harvard Law Review 119, 1641–1679. 
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J.L. and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155. 
 
Gordon, J. G. (2007). The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: of shareholder value and stock market prices. Stanford Law Review, 1465. 
 
  346 
Gordon, E. A. (2008). Sustainability in global financial reporting and innovation in 
 institutions. Accounting Research Journal. 21(3), 231-238. 
 
Gorton, G. and Schmid, F. (1996). Universal banking and the performance of German 
firms. Working paper 5453. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA.  
 
Gray, R., Bebbington, J. and Collinson, D. (2006). NGO’s, civil society and 
 accountability: Making the people accountable to capital. Accounting, Auditing 
 and Accountability Journal, 19, 319-344. 
 
Gupta, A., Otley, D. and Young, S. (2008). Does superior firm performance lead to 
 higher quality outside directorships? Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
 Journal, 21(7), 907-32. 
 
Gurdon, M. A. and Rai, A. (1990). Codetermination and enterprise performance: 
empirical evidence from West Germany. Journal of Economics and 
Business, 42, 289. 
 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., and Tatham, R. L. (2006). 
Multivariate Data Analysis, (6
th
 ed.). Uppersaddle River, New Jersey: Pearson 
Education International, Inc.  
 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., and Anderson, R .E. (2010). Multivariate data 
analysis, a global perspective (7
th
 ed.). Uppersaddle River, New Jersey: Pearson  
Prentice Hall. 
 
Hair, Jr., J. F., Money, A. H., Samouel, P. & Page, M. (2007). Research methods for 
 business. Chichester: John Willey & Sons Ltd. 
 
  347 
Hambrick, D. C., van Werder, A. V., and Zajac, E. J. (2008). New directions in 
corporate governance research. Organization Science, 19, 381–385.  
 
Hansell, C. (2003). What Directors Need to Know: Corporate Governance . Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell. 
 
Harrison, J. S. and Freeman, R. E. (1999). Stakeholders, social responsibility, and 
performance: empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of 
Management Journal 42(5), 479-485. 
 
Harrison, J. S. and Freeman, R. E. (2004). Is organizational democracy worth the effort? 
The Academy of Management Executive, 18(3), 49-53. 
 
Healey, P. M. and Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal 
Accounting and Economics, 31, 405-440. 
 
Hendry, J. (2005). Beyond self-interest: Agency theory and the board in a satisficing 
world. British Journal of Management, 16(special issue), 55–64. 
 
Higgs Review (2003). Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive Directors, 
UK department of Trade and Industry. London. 
 
Hillman, A. J. and Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: 
integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of 
Management Review 28, 383–396. 
 
Holmes-Smith, P., Coote, L., and Cunningham, E. (2005). Structural Equation 
Modeling: from the fundamentals to advanced topics. School Research, 
Evaluation and Measurement Services, Melbourne. 
 
  348 
Hope, O.-K. (2002). Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards and 
 analysts’ forecast accuracy: An international study. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 41(2). 
 
Hopner M. and Jackson, G. (2001). An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The 
 case of Mannesmann and German Corporate Governance, MPIfG Discussion 
 Paper 01/4.  
 
Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and creating accountability: a framework for exploring 
behavioral perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management 
16, 65 79. 
 
Huse, M. and Zattoni, A. (2008). Trust, firm life cycle and actual board behavior: 
Evidence from ‘one of the lads’ in three small firms. International Studies of 
Management and Organization, 3, 71–97. 
 
Huse, M., Hoskisson, R., Zattoni, A., and Viganò, R. (2011). New perspectives on board 
research: changing the research agenda. J Manag Gov, 15, 5–28 DOI 
10.1007/s10997-009-9122-9. 
 
Ibru, C. (2008). The Corporate Governance Question. Presentation at the national 
roundtable for proactive laws and good governance in Nigeria held at the 
executive hall of the international conference centre, June 30
th
 Abuja.   
 
Ibrahim, B. S. (2009). Banking legislations in Nigeria: Authorization, Obligation, 
Supervision and Control. Working Paper. 
dsspace.unijos.edu.ng/bitstream/10485/351/1/266-279. 
  
ICAN (2004).  Journal of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria, 28(2), 
Lagos 
  349 
 Institutional Shareholder Services (2003). ISS Corporate Governance Quotient, 
 ISS, Rockville, MD. 
 
Ingley, C. and Van der Walt, N. (2005). Do board processes influence director and board 
performance? Statutory and performance implications. Corporate Governance, 
13 (5).  
 
Inkpen, A. C. and Tsang, E. W. (2005). Social capital, networks and knowledge transfer 
. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 146 – 166. 
 
Isele, G. (2004). An evaluation of the effectiveness of stress management techniques in 
Nigerian industries. An unpublished MBA Thesis in Rivers State University of  
Science and Technology. 
 
Isele, G. and Ugoji, E. I. (2009). Stress Management and Corporate Governance in 
Nigerian Organizations. European Journal of Scientific Research, 27(3), 472-
478. 
 
Itami, H. and Gabanansu, N. K. (2000), Japanese-Style Corporate Governance, In Araki 
 T. (2005) A Comparative Analysis: Corporate Governance and Labour and 
 Employment Relations in Japan. Company Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22(1).   
 
Itami, H. and Kigyo, J. (1993). Employee-Centered Corporation, In Araki T. (2005) A 
 Comparative Analysis: Corporate Governance and Labour and Employment 
 Relations in Japan. Company Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22(1).   
 
Ito, T. and Patrick, H. (2005). Problems and prescriptions for Japanese economy: an 
overview. In Takatoshi Ito, Hugh Patrick, and David E. Weinstein (eds.) 
Reviving Japan’s Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 1-36. 
 
  350 
Jackson, G. (2005). Stakeholders under pressure: corporate governance and labour 
management in Germany and Japan. Blackwell Publishig Ltd, 13(3), 419-428. 
 
Jackson, G. and Moerke, A. (2005). Continuity and change in corporate governance: 
 comparing Germany and Japan. Corporate Governance, 13(3), 355-359. 
 
Janis, I. L. (1983). Groupthink: psychological studies of foreign policy decisions and 
fiascos (2
nd
 ed). Boston: Houghton Miffling Company. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Coporate Finance and 
Takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323-339. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal 
 control system. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 88-107. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-60. 
 
John, S., Patrick, M. W., and David, U. (2008). The Routledge Companion to Strategic 
Human Resource Management. Routledge 2008. 
 
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M. and Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of directors: a review 
and research agenda. Journal of Management 22, 409–439. 
 
Jones, D. C. (1987). The productivity effects of worker directors and financial 
participation by employees in the firm: the case of British retail co-operatives. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 41(1), 79–92. 
 
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and 
 economics. Academy of Management Review, 20, 404-437.   
 
  351 
Jong, H. (1995). European Capitalism Between Freedom and Social Justice, 10 Revised 
Industrial Organization. 410. Seen in Dore, R. (2005). Comment: papers on 
employees and corporate governance. Company Labor Law and Policy Journal 
(22)159. 
 
Kadlec, D. (2002). Worldcon, Time, July 8. 
 
Kaiser, H. F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Pchometrika, 39, 31-36. 
 
Kaplan, S. and Minton, B. (1994). Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: 
determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 
36, 225–257. 
 
Kaplan, S. and Stein, J. (1993). The evolution of buy out pricing and financial structure 
in the 80’s. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 313-357. 
 
Karmel, R. (1993). Implications of the Stakeholder Model. George Washington Law 
Review, 61. 1156-1157. 
 
Kay, J. and Silberston, A. (1995). Corporate governance. National Institute of Economic 
 Review, 84, 84-97. 
 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (1997). Introduction: The corporate 
 governance problem-competing diagnoses and solutions in Keasey, K., 
 Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (Eds), Corporate Governance: Economic and 
 Financial Issues, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Kendall, N. and Kendall, A. (1998). A Real World Corporate Governance: A 
Programme  for Profit Enhancing Stewardship, FT Pitman, London, pp. 26.   
 
Khanchel, I. (2007). Corporate governance: Measurement and determinant analysis. 
 Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(8), 740-760. 
  352 
Kiel, G. and Nicholson, G. (2003). Boards that Work: A New Guide for Directors. North 
Ryde: McGraw- Hill Australia Pty Ltd. 
 
Kim, Y. (2005). Board network characteristics and firm performance in Korea. 
Corporate Governance, 13(6), 800-808. 
 
Kimbro, M.B. (2002). A cross country empirical investigation of corruption and its 
relationship to economic, cultural and monitoring institutions: an examination of 
the role of accounting and financial statements quality. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance,17(4), 325–49. 
 
Kings Report I (1994). The Kings Report on Corporate Governance for South-Africa. 
The Institute of Directors in South Africa, Johannesburg, 29 November. 
 
Kings Report II (2002). The Kings Report on Corporate Governance for South-Africa. 
Kings  Committee on Corporate Governance, Institute of Directors in Southern 
Africa, Johannesburg. 
 
Klapper, L.F. and Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection and 
performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 703-
728. 
 
Kline, R.B. (2005). Priciples and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (2nd ed.). 
New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Konstant, P. (1999). Exit, voice and loyalty in the course of corporate governance and 
counsel’s changing role course of corporate governance and counsel’s changing 
role. Journal of Socio Economics, 28(3), 203-214. 
 
Krejcie, V. and Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1970. 
  353 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around 
 the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-518. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997). Legal 
 determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law and 
 finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
 
Leibler, M. (2003). Commercial and Corporate implications of the ASX principles of 
 good corporate governance for listed companies. Abl Bulletin Wednesday 4 June.  
 
Letza, S. Kirkbride, J. Sun, X. Smallman, C. (2008). Corporate governance theorizing: 
 limits, critics and alternatives. International Journal of Law and Management, 
 50(1), 17-32. 
 
Leung, P. and Cooper, B.J. (2003). The Mad Hatter’s corporate tea party. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 18(6/7), 505-16. 
 
Lomax, R. G. (2007). Statistical concepts: a second course for education and the 
behavioral sciences, (3
rd
 ed.). New York: Routledge. 
 
MacLeod, D. and Clarke, N. (2009). Engaging for Success: enhancing performance 
through employee engagement. A report to Government, Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. www.bis.gov.uk.   
 
Maharaj, R. (2009). Corporate governance decision-making model: how to nominate 
 skilled board members, by addressing the formal and informal systems. 
 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 6(2), 106-126. 
 
  354 
Mardjono, A. (2005). A tale of corporate governance: Lessons why firms fail. 
 Managerial Auditing Journal, 20(3), 272-283. 
 
Marshall, S. and Ramsay, I. (2006). Stakeholders and Directors’ Duties: Law Theory 
and Evidence. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Maxwell 59 
ACSR 373. 
 
Marston, C. and Shrives, P. (1996). A review of empirical research into financial 
disclosure. Working paper, University of Northumbria at Newcastle. 
 
McCabe, M. and Nowak, M. (2008). The independent director on the board of company 
 directors. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(6), 545-566. 
 
McKinsey & Co. (2005). Investor opinion in corporate governance. Available at: 
 www.worldbank.org  
 
Meisenzahl, R. R. (2011). Verifying the state of financing constraints: evidence from 
U.S business credit contracts. Federal Reserve Board. 
 
Mitchell, L. (2007). The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, Cambridge University Press, 279. 
 
Mitchell, A. and Sikka, P. (2006). Pensions crisis: a failure of public policymaking. 
Association for Accountancy & Business Affairs, Basildon. 
 
Mohd Hassan, C. H., Rashidah A. and Sakti, M. (2008). Corporate governance, 
transparency and performance of Malaysian companies. Managerial Auditing 
Journal 23(8), 744-778.  
 
Monks, R.A. and Minow, N. (2008). Corporate Governance (4
th 
ed). Wiley, 
 Chichester.  
 
  355 
Morgan, J. (1999). The Board is no longer just a “Rubber Stamp”. TMA Journal, 19, 14-
18. 
 
Ndanusa, S.A. (2004). The Role of Securities and Exchange Commission in Corporate 
Government. Paper presented during a joint workshop at the 1st Annual 
Conference on Corporate Governance and Practices for Directors, Organised by 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)/Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
and Administrators of Nigeria (ICSAN). 
 
Nicholsen, G.J. and Kiel, G.C. (2004). A framework for diagnosing board effectiveness. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 442 – 460. 
 
Nigeria (2003). Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria. The Securities and Exchange 
 Commission, Abuja.  
 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (2003). Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria. 
 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (2009). NSE Fact Book for 2009. Lagos: The Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (2006). Yearly Bulletin. NASB, Abuja.  
 
Nmehielle, V.O. and Nwauche, E.S. (2004). External-Internal Standards in Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper NO. 115, 
The George Washington University Law School. 
 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. 
Organization  Science, 5(1), 14-37. 
 
Obaze, J. (2008). Nigerian Accounting Standards Board. Lagos, Nigeria. 
 
  356 
O'Donovan, G. (2004). A Board Culture of Corporate Governance. Corporate 
Governance International Journal, 6(3), 22-30. 
 
Ogbechie, C. and Koufopoulos, D. N. (2009). Board effectiveness in the Nigerian 
Banking Industry. Working Paper.  
 
Ogbuozobe, F. (2009). A consideration of the impact of the Companies and Allied 
 Matters Act (1990) and the Insurance Act (2003) on the board of insurance 
 companies in Nigeria, part 1. International Journal of Law and Management, 
 51(5), 336-358.   
 
Okabe, M. (2004). The financial system and corporate governance in Japan.  Policy and 
Governance Working Paper Series No. 17 
 
Okereke, N. (2007). Incidences of Inaccurate Financial Reporting in Nigeria. Paper 
 presentation at a forum in Calabar, Nigeria.  
 
Okike, E.N.M. (1994). Curious Auditing Regulations in Nigeria: a case study of 
cultural/political influences on auditing practices. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 29, 78–91. 
 
Okike, E.N.M. (2004). Management of crisis: the response of the auditing profession in 
 Nigeria to the challenge to its legitimacy. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
 Journal, 17(5), 705-730. 
 
Okike, E.N.M. (2007). Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the status quo. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 15(2), 173–193. 
 
Okpara, J.O. (2009). Perspectives on Corporate Governance Challenges in a Sub-
Saharan African Economy. Proceedings of the Annual American Business 
Research Conference 29-29 September 2009 Flushing, New York. 
  357 
Ong, C.H. and Wan, D. (2008). Three conceptual models of board role performance. 
 Corporate Governance, 8(3), 317-329.  
 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1999). Principles 
of Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris. 
 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004). Principles 
of Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris.  
 
Otsuka, S. (2006). Promotion of Employee Participation in Corporate Governance in 
Japan through Institutionalizing the Supervisory Board: Implications and      
Lessons from German Experience. Japan Center for Economic Research, 74.  
 
Oyejide, T. A. and Soyibo, A. (2001). Corporate Governance in Nigeria. Paper 
Presented at the Conference on Corporate Governance, Accra, Ghana. 
 
Pallant, J. (2005). SPSS Survival Manual. Open University Press, New York, NY. 
 
Pettigrew, A. (1992), On studying managerial élites. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 
Winter, 163-82. 
 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1997). What is a Processual Analysis?. Scandinavian Management 
Journal, 13, 337–348. 
 
Pistor, K. (2005). Legal ground rules in coordinated and liberal market economies. 
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 30. Available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=695763 
 
Polonksy M. and Ryan, P. (1996). The Implications of Stakeholder Statutes for Socially 
Responsible Managers. Business & Professional Ethics Journal, 15, 3-16. 
 
  358 
Pye, A. and Pettigrew, A. M. (2005). Studying board context, process and dynamics: 
some challenges for the future. British Journal of Management, 16, 27–38. 
 
Quindlen, A. (2002). The axis of re-election. Newsweek, March 4. 
 
Rashidah, A. and Mohammad Rizal, S. (2010). Corporate Governance in Malaysia: 
Theory, Law and Context (1
st
 ed). Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Thomson Reuters. 
 
Rea, L. M. and Parker, R. A. (2005). Designing and conducting survey research: a 
comprehensive guide. 3rd edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
 
Rhody, R. (2004). Standing upright in perilous times: the CEO, the board, & us. Public 
Relations Quarterly, 49, 2-6. 
 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T. and Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work 
of the non-executive director: creating accountability in the boardroom. British 
Journal of Management 16, S5–S26, special issue. 
 
Robinson, D., Perryman S., and Hayday, S. (2004). The drivers of employee 
engagement. Institute of Employment Studies Report, 408. UK 
 
Robinson, P. and Shimizu, N. (2006). Japanese corporate restructuring: CEO priorities 
as a window on environmental and organizational change. Academy of 
Management Perspectives 20(3), 44-75. 
 
Rodano, G., Serrano-Velarde, N. and Tarantino, E. (2011). Bankruptcy law and financial 
contracting: the impact of the Italian 2005/2006 bankruptcy law reform on the 
cost of finance of firms. Preliminary Working Paper. 
 
Rose, C. (2004). Stakeholder orientation vs. shareholder value - a matter of contractual 
failures. European Journal of Law and Economics 18(1).   
  359 
Rosenfield, P. (2006). Contemporary Issues in Financial Reporting, Routledge, Taylor  
& Francis Group. 
 
Rossant, J. Ewing, J., and Bremner, B. (2002). The corporate cleanup goes global. 
Business Week, May 6. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). US Legislature H.R.3763. 
 
Sadowski, D. Junkes, J. and Lindenthal, S. (2005). The German Model of Corporate and 
 Labor Governance, Company Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22(33).  
 
Sanda, A.U., Garba, T. and Mikailu, A.S. (2008). Board independence and firm financial 
performance: evidence from Nigeria. Centre for the Study of African Economies 
(CSAE) Conference 2008 titled Economic Development in Africa at St 
Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford. 
 
Sarkar, J. (2009). Board Independence & Corporate Governance in India: recent trends 
& challenges ahead. The Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, 44(4). 
 
Sarkar, J. and Sarkar, S. (2000). Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance 
in Developing Countries: evidence from India, International Review of Finance, 
1, 161–195. 
 
Sarkar J. and Sarkar, S. (2009). Multiple board appointments and firm performance in 
emerging economies: evidence from India. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 17(2), 
271-93. 
 
Saudagaran, S. and Diga, J. (1997). Financial reporting in emerging capital markets: 
characteristics and policy issues. Accounting Horizons, 11(2), 41-64. 
 
  360 
Schmidt, R. (2004). Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective, In 
 Allen, F. Carletti, E. and Marquez R. (2009). Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate 
 Governance and Firm Value, Working Paper 07-39, Wharton Financial 
 Institutions Centre, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Schnabel, C. and Wagner, J. (1994). Industrial Relations and Trade Union Effects on 
 Innovation in Germany, Labor, 8, 489. 
 
Schuetz, S. A. (2010). Structured Finance Influence on Financial Market Stability –
Evaluation of Current Regulatory Developments. This version: “Preliminary 
draft” June 2010. 
 
Scott, M. S., and Gerald, S. A. (2010). An Introduction to Marketing Research. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2005). Journal of Securities and Exchange 
 Commission Nigeria, 4. 
 
Sekaran, U. (2003). Research methods for business. New York: John Wiley and Sons 
Inc. 
 
Sheard, P. (1994) Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance. In M. Aoki 
and R. Dore (eds) The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength. 
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 310-349. 
 
Sherwin, L. ( 2003 ). Building an effective board. Bank Accounting and Finance 16 (5), 
22-29. 
 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
 Finance, 52, 737-83. 
 
  361 
Sikka, P. (2008). Corporate governance: What about the workers? Accounting, Auditing, 
 & Accountability Journal, 21(7). 
 
Sikka, P. and Hampton, M.P. (2005). The role of accountancy firms in tax avoidance: 
some evidence and issues. Accounting Forum, 29(3), 325-43. 
 
Singer, J. (1993). Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate. University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 43. 475-503. 
 
Smith Report (2003). Audit Committees: combined code guidance. Financial Reporting 
Council, London. 
 
S&P (2004). Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores and Evaluations: 
 Criteria, Methodology and Definitions, Standard & Poor’s Governance Services, 
 New York, NY. 
 
Solomon, J. and Solomon, A. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability, Wiley, 
 Chichester. 
 
Sonnenfeld, J. (2002). What makes great boards great? Harvard Business Review, 80(9), 
 106-113.  
 
Stein, M.J. (2008). Beyond the boardroom: governmental perspectives on corporate 
 governance. Accounting, Auditing, & Accountability Journal, 21(7).  
 
Stiles, P. (2001). The impact of the board on strategy: an empirical examination. Journal 
of Management Studies, 38, 627-650. 
 
Stiles, P. and Taylor, B. (2001). Boards at work: how directors view their roles and 
responsibilities. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
  362 
Summers, J. and Hyman, J. (2005). Employee participation and company performance: 
a literature review. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, University of Aberdeen. ISBN 
1 85935 299 5 (pdf: available at www.jrf.org.uk). 
 
Taplin, R.H., Tower, G. and Hancock, P. (2002). Disclosure (discernibility) and 
 compliance of accounting policies: Asia Pacific Evidence. Accounting Forum, 
 26(2), 172-190. 
 
Tarraf, H. (2010). Literature review on corporate governance and the recent financial 
crisis. Available at SRRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1731044. December, 2010.  
 
Tricker, R. I. (1984). Corporate Governance. Aldershot: Gower Press. 
 
Tricker, R. I. (1994). International Corporate Governance. Simon & Schuster, 
Singapore. 
 
Turner, A. G. (2003). Sampling frames and master samples. United Nations Secretariat, 
Statistics Division. 
 
UK Office for National Statistics (2006). Share of the Wealth, ONS, London, available 
at: www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id 
 
Van Ees, H., Gabrielsson, J. and Huse, M. (2009). Toward a behavioral theory of boards 
and corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
17(3),  307-319.  
 
Van Ees, H., Van der Laan, G., and Postma, T.J.B.M. (2008). Effective board behavior 
in The Netherlands. European Management Journal, 26(2), 84-93.  
 
Vanguard (2009). Nigeria: FG set to introduce new code of corporate governance. 
 Vanguard, 3 April. Also available at http://allAfrica.com/stories/200904030028. 
  363 
Veal, A. J. (2005). Business Research Methods: A Managerial Approach. Australia: 
Pearson Education Australia. 
 
Vitols, S. (2004) Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-
 American Practice, Competition and Change, 8(4), 1-18. 
 
Waddington, J. (2003) ‘Trade union organization’, in P. Edwards Industrial Relations: 
Theory and Practice. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Wallace, R.S.O. (1990). Accounting in developing countries: A review of the literature. 
Research in Third World Accounting, 1, 3-54. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI   
Press. 
 
Wan, D. and Ong, C.H. (2005). Board structure, process and performance: evidence 
from public listed companies in Singapore. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13(2), 277-290. 
 
Weiss, A. (1995). Cracks in the Foundations of Stakeholder Theory. Electronic Journal 
of Radical Organizational Theory.  
            http://www.mgnt.waikato.ac.nz/research/ejrot:Vol1_1/weiss.pdf. 
 
Whitley R. (1999). Divergent Capitalisms: The social Structure and Change of Business 
 Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Willenborg, G., Van Ees, H. and Huse, M. (2007). Qualifying agency theory’s discrete 
interactions assumptions: a reassessment of calls for independent board of 
directors. European Academy of Management Meeting, Corporate Governance 
Best Paper Proceedings, (Paris, 2007). 
 
  364 
Wilson, I. (2006). Regulatory and Institutional Challenges of Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria Post Banking Consolidation. Nigerian Economic Summit Group 
Economic Indicators, 12(2), April-June. 
 
World Bank (2004). Report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) Nigeria, 
corporate governance country assessment: Nigeria, World Bank-IMG, 
Washington, DC, June 17. 
 
Yakasai, A.G.A. (2001). Corporate governance in a third world country with particular 
 reference to Nigeria. Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 9(3), 238-253. 
 
Yeoh, P. (2007). Corporate governance models: Is there a right one for transition 
 economies in Central and Eastern Europe? Managerial Law, 49(3), 57-75.  
 
Yeoh, P. (2010). Causes of the global financial crisis: Learning from the competing 
insights. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7, 42-69. 
 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
 directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-212. 
 
Yoshimori, M. (1995). Whose Company is it? The Concept of the Corporation in Japan 
 and the West, Long Range Planning 28, 33-44. 
 
Zahra, S.A. and Filatotchev, I. (2004). Governance of the entrepreneurial threshold firm: 
a knowledge-based perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 41. 885-97. 
 
Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: a review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15(2), 
291-334. 
 
  365 
Zandstra, G. (2002). Enron, board governance and moral failings. Corporate 
 Governance, 2, 16-19. 
 
Zikmund, G. W. (2000). Business Research Methods (7th ed.). 
 
Zingales, L. (2000). In search of new foundations. Journal of Finance, LV, 1623–1653. 
 
Zona, F. and Zattoni, A. (2007). Beyond the black box of demography: Board processes 
and task effectiveness within Italian firms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 15, 852–864. 
 
Zuaini Ishak & Napier, C. (2006). Expropriation of minority interests and corporate 
 diversification in Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal of 
 Accounting and Finance, 2, 85-113. 
 
